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Hume's Argument for the Ontological 




In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of 
rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 
1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real 
distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and 
his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every 
perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense-perception and his Copy 
Principle. I will also show why Hume's argument should be seen as relevant nowadays. 
David Lewis and his followers in metaphysics continue Hume's line of thinking in this 
respect, which is opposed by power ontologists (Brian Ellis, Stephen Mumford), for 
example. 




For his time, Hume was a radical philosopher in many respects. Before him, 
Berkeley perhaps excluding, the dominant view in metaphysics was that accidents, modes, 
qualities, or properties – however they were called – depend for their existence on the 
individual substance that bears them. In this scheme, individual substances are 
ontologically independent entities, whereas properties are ontologically dependent; there 
cannot be properties without individual substances. 
In his first work A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 (1739), Hume turned this 
upside down. In Treatise 1, he argues that some properties are fundamental, basic entities: 
they are ontologically independent composing individual substances in the sense of minds 
(temporal individuals) and bodies (concrete, i.e. spatio-temporal individuals) but not in 
the sense of ontologically independent building blocks of the world. In this paper, I will 
reconstruct Hume's argument with the result that qualitatively and compositionally 
(having no parts) simple properties are ontologically independent. The best-known 
version of that argument is the infamous reasoning of T 1.4.5.5 (SBN 233)1 where Hume 
argues that the distinction between substances and accidents or souls and perceptions is 
inconceivable if accidents and perceptions are supposed to be existentially independent. 
In the 20th century, D.C. Williams (1899-1983) and Keith Campbell followed Hume 
in this respect. They created theories, in which individual substances, or, to use the 
contemporary term “concrete particulars”, are composed of particular property instances, 
which are called “tropes”.2 As according to Campbell substances are bundles of tropes, 
                                                 
1  References to Hume’s works will be abbreviated in the standard manner as follows. “T” = David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), followed by book, part, section, and paragraph number. “T Abs.” = David 
Hume, An Abstract of … A Treatise of Human Nature, in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A 
Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 403-
417, followed by paragraph number. “T App.” = David Hume, Appendix, in David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007), 396-401, followed by paragraph number. “EHU” = David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding: A Critical Edition, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 
followed by section and paragraph number. “SBN” refers to the old Selby-Bigge Nidditch editions of the 
Treatise and the Enquiries. 
2  I ask the reader to take into consideration that this is an introduction to a primarily historical paper. 
So it will not be necessary to go into all the details of the contemporary positions. 
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his account is called “trope-bundle theory of substances”. Moreover, it may be termed 
“independence trope-bundle theory of substances” because he agrees with Hume on the 
ontological independence of tropes. (Campbell 1981) 
The ontological independence of tropes has been a contested issue since Campbell 
published his view. Peter Simons and Markku Keinänen have argued against Campbell 
and defended the view that individual substances are composed of tropes that depend for 
their existence on each other.3 Let us assume that an individual substance is composed of 
tropes t1 to t4. Tropes t1 to t4 are mutually ontologically dependent in the sense of rigid 
existential dependence. This means that given one of them, all the others must be there, 
too (metaphysical necessity). The individual substance is an aggregate consisting of tropes 
t1 to t4 as its proper parts.4 As it is the existential dependence closure of these tropes (all 
the existential needs of tropes t1 to t4 are fulfilled), it is rigidly existentially independent 
from every wholly distinct entity (a whole is merely partially distinct from its proper 
parts). Simons' and Keinänen's theories can thus accommodate the traditional view that 
individual substances are ontologically independent (in the sense of rigid existential 
independence), but they depart from the dominant tradition in that for them, it is 
properties, rather than substances, which are the basic building blocks of the universe. 
(Simons 1994 and Keinänen 2011, Ch. 4) Therefore they may be seen as following Hume 
in this respect but at the same time claiming something that Hume thought impossible: 
there are existential dependences, or in Hume's terms, necessary connections, between 
wholly distinct parts of a whole (T App. 20; SBN 635-6). Their theories may thus be 
called “dependence trope-theories of substances”. 
Hume's argument for the ontological independence of simple properties is 
contemporally relevant for another reason as well. Here I am referring to the recent 
metaphysical debate over the ultimate nature of the world between Lewisians and power 
ontologists. David Lewis (1941-2001) claims that 
                                                 
3  Here I am considering their theories together although there are significant differences in the 
details between them. 
4  This is merely a simple example where all the tropes of a simple substance (no other substances as 
its parts) are necessary to it. It does not has to be so. Simon's and Keinänen's theories can accommodate 
cases where there are also tropes contingent to a simple substance. Yet these tropes are rigidly existentially 
dependent on the necessary tropes, which are, in turn, generically existentially dependent on the contingent 
tropes. So there can be qualitative change according to Simons and Keinänen. 
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“Humean supervenience is named in honour of the great denier of necessary connections. It is the 
doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little 
thing and then another. […] We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-temporal 
distance between points. […] And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic 
properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an 
arrangement of qualities. And this is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrangement 
of qualities. All else supervenes on that.” (Lewis 1986, xi-x) 
In contrast with Campbell, Simons, Keinänen and possibly Hume, Lewis is not a 
trope nominalist but a class nominalist, according to which properties are classes of things 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2008). So the properties about which he is talking in this famous 
quote are not building blocks of the universe. Rather, that role is played by the “little” 
things, point-sized objects. Still Lewis agrees with Hume that the ultimate constituents of 
the world are rather passive than dynamic and the fundamental properties are categorical 
and intrinsic. He also follows Hume by denying necessary connections between the 
fundamentals. 
Power ontologists such as George Molnár, Brian Ellis and Stephen Mumford 
oppose this. They see the world as fundamentally dynamic. For them, the basic properties 
are not inert, categorical, self-contained “perfectly natural intrinsic properties”, between 
which there cannot be necessary connections. Rather, the world is ultimately composed of 
powerful dispositions that are necessarily connected with other entities (Ellis 2001, Ch. 8 
and Mumford 2004, Ch. 10.6). For example, given that there are two gravitational masses 
– two dispositions –, it is necessary that they attract each other, which is an event 
necessarily connected to the masses. 
Choosing between Humean supervenience and power ontology has deep 
consequences for one's view on the laws of nature, for instance. If the world is seen as 
fundamentally causally inert, it seems that the laws of nature must be either somehow 
superimposed on it or only law statements. On the contrary, dispositionalist power 
ontology might make laws of nature as distinct entities in themselves redundant without 
rendering them mere theoretical statements (Mumford 2004, 15). Another intimately 
connected issue is the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties. It is 
natural for a Lewisian to hold that dispositions merely supervene upon categorical 
properties, which a power ontologist denies – she maintains that at least some 
fundamental properties are dispositional. 
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Lewis' Humean supervenience may be seen as continuing the line of Hume's 
thinking in the respect that fundamental entities are ontologically independent (no 
necessary connections between them), causally inert and basic properties are categorical, 
intrinsic qualities. Therefore Hume's argument for the ontological independence of simple 
properties, which are fundamental entities for him, is in itself – or should be seen as – 
topical. Accordingly, I will finish the paper by pointing out, for a dependence trope 
theorist or dispositional power ontologist, some possible soft spots of Hume's argument 
within the context of contemporary philosophy. The ending is motivated by taking the 
dependence trope theory and dispositional power ontology more powerful in explanatory 
force than the Lewisian-Campbellian-Humean line – an assumption that cannot be 
defended here. 
The paper has a four-part structure. In §1, I summarise very briefly the technicalities 
that are necessary before discussing the argument. The second section consists mainly of 
quoting the passages that bring forward Hume's argument. In §3, I present Hume's 
sentences in the logical order of the argument. This leads to a detailed reconstruction of 
the argument in the fourth part, which concludes truly the argument of the paper. I will 
finish the paper with an epilogue where I come back to the contemporary issues outlined 
in the introduction. 
1 Necessary Technicalities 
It is obvious that every argument must take something for granted; it is not possible 
to give reasons for everything in a line of reasoning. One of the assumptions of this paper 
is that by his central technical term “perception”, Hume means the objects of thinking in 
the broad sense (including sense-perceptions, passions, emotions, feelings, and 
sentiments), rather than the acts of the mind. He explicitly says that there are perceptions 
even if some of them are not in space (visual and tactile are spatial, phenomenally) (T 
1.4.5.10; SBN 235, see also T 1.2.6.2 and 6; SBN 66-67). So for Hume perceptions 
belong to the category of existence – , as ideas for Berkeley. In a word, they are entities or 
elements of being. As perceptions are objects of thinking, they fall into a sub-category of 
entities that may be called cognitive objects (“cognitive” in the broad sense of thinking). 
As is widely known, Hume holds that there are two kinds of perceptions: 
impressions and ideas. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to say that sense 
perceptions are impressions and thoughts about them are ideas. 
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Hume's other distinction of perceptions into simple and complex (T 1.1.1.2; SBN 2) 
is connected to a form of distinction that many Scholastic and some early modern 
philosophers employed: real distinction.5 For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to say 
that x is really distinct from y iff x is separable from y and vice versa (Glauser 2002, 423-
4). In Hume's case, real distinction between x and y involves, for the reasons that will 
become clear in the paper, that they do not share any parts (spatial or not).6 Following his 
predecessors, Hume explicitly distinguishes real distinction from rational distinction or 
distinction of reason, which does not involve separability but real identity (so it is not real 
distinction) (T 1.1.7.17-8; SBN 24-5). 
In the paper, I also use the notion of ontological dependence/independence. I am 
aware of the debate over them in contemporary metaphysics (e.g. Correia 2005, Lowe 
1998, Ch. 6 and Simons 1987, 290ff.). However, I hope this paper can show that in 
Hume's case they may be taken in quite a straightforward manner as rigid existential 
dependence/independence: x is ontologically dependent on y iff there cannot be x without 
y and x is ontologically independent from y iff there can be x without y.7 
As will be shown below, Hume's Copy Principle (CP) is necessary for 
understanding the first premise of Hume's argument. Regarding it, I follow Don Garrett's 
account. According to Garrett, the CP involves two theses: the Resemblance Thesis and 
the Causal Thesis (1997, 21-22). The Resemblance Thesis states that every simple idea 
resembles (is similar to) some simple impression. The Causal Thesis makes the same 
statement in terms of causality: every simple idea is caused by some simple impression – 
at least partially. As Hume himself says: “all our simple ideas in their first appearance 
are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they 
exactly represent.” (T 1.1.1.7; SBN 4) Together with the distinction between simple and  
complex perceptions, the CP entails that every idea derives fundamentally from 
impressions because complex perceptions consist completely of simple perceptions (T 
1.1.1.6; SBN 4). 
Finally, before proceeding to Hume's argument, I must say a word about how my 
talk about properties should be understood. First, for Hume all properties are particulars 
                                                 
5  It may also be called non-identity as if x and y are really distinct, they are not really identical. 
6  I have made the full case for this elsewhere [self-reference omitted]. 
7  Here I leave the modality in terms of which rigid existential dependence/independence is stated 
open on purpose. I will specify it in Hume's case below. 
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because according to him, there are no universals; Hume is a nominalist (T 1.1.7.6; SBN 
19-20). Secondly, in terms of the contemporary distinction, they are rather 'categorical' 
than 'dispositional'. In this paper, I will restrict myself to the perceptions of simple proper 
sensible properties, which are the objects of one of the five senses (colours, tactile, 
sounds, smells, tastes). I will exclude the perceptions of passions, emotions, feelings, and 
sentiments, since it seems that they are not properties. I will show that for Hume proper 
sensible properties are rather categorical than dispositional because they do not include 
any disposition or power. Categorical properties are non-dispositional properties. 
2 Passages 
In the section of the Treatise titled Of the antient philosophy, Hume writes: 
“Every quality being a distinct thing from another, may be conceiv’d to exist apart, and may exist 
apart, not only from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance.” (T 
1.4.3.7; SBN 222) 
Of the antient philosophy is the third section of the fourth part in Book 1 of the 
Treatise. Despite its title, the target of the critical discussion in the section is rather 
medieval Aristotelianism, or how Hume understands it, than ancient philosophy. The 
specific target of this passage, which appears at the seventh paragraph of the section, is 
the notion of accident in the Aristotelian substance-accident ontology. According to this 
(historically simplifying) scheme, accidents are ontologically dependent existents 
supported by, or as the phrase goes 'inhering in' substances, which are independent in their 
ontological status. In the passage, Hume argues – tentatively formulated – that this 
scheme is inconceivable as accidents or qualities are ontologically independent: their 
existence does not depend on the existence of any other quality or substance. 
Unfortunately, Hume's presentation here is very dense so it is not easy to see what 
his argument actually is. Fortunately, there are other passages in Treatise 1, on the basis 
of which we are able to reconstruct Hume's argument that simple properties are 
ontologically independent. 
The first and most important of them may be found two sections later, near the 
beginning of Of the immateriality of the soul, in paragraph five of this section (1.4.5.5; 
SBN 233). As will be seen very soon, it is justified to quote this rather long paragraph in 
its entirety: 
“IF instead of answering these questions, any one shou’d evade the difficulty, by saying, that the 
definition of a substance is something which may exist by itself; and that this definition ought to 
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satisfy us: Shou’d this be said, I shou’d observe, that this definition agrees to every thing, that can 
possibly be conceiv’d; and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from 
its perceptions. For thus I reason. Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever is clearly 
conceiv’d, after any manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one principle, which has been 
already acknowledg’d. Again, every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing 
which is distinguishable, is separable by the imagination. This is another principle. My conclusion 
from both is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in 
the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as separately existent, and 
may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence. They are, 
therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance.” 
Here Hume clearly argues against substance-accident ontology. His point is that if 
substance is defined as ontologically independent entity, it cannot be distinguished from 
accidents, or the soul as a substance from its perceptions. For it follows from the two 
principles, which Hume considers established at this point in the Treatise, that qualities 
and perceptions are ontologically independent, that is, they are substances rather than the 
qualities of substances or the perceptions of spiritual substances. 
Hume uses the second principle explicitly in two other similar passages for the same 
conclusion concerning perceptions. In them, the first principle is more implicit. The first 
of the passages is from the beginning of the infamous Of personal identity (1.4.6): 
“All these [perceptions] are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may 
be separately consider’d, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their 
existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?” 
(T 1.4.6.3; SBN 252; see also 1.4.6.16; SBN 259-60) 
The other passage is part of Hume's summary of his thinking on personal identity in 
the Appendix, which was inserted into Book 3 of the Treatise published 20 months later 
than Book 1: 
“WHATEVER is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the 
thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and 
separable, and may be conceiv’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any 
contradiction or absurdity.” (T App. 12; SBN 634) 
3 Argument in Hume's Words 
The first premise of Hume's argument in his own words concerns perceptions: 
“all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe” (T 
1.4.5.5; SBN 233) 
“All perceptions are distinct.” (T App. 12; SBN 634) 
The original formulation is in terms of qualities: 
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“Every quality being a distinct thing from another”. (T 1.4.3.7; SBN 222) 
Premise two is the first of Hume's two principles. In the literature, it is called, 
following Garrett (1997, 9), Hume's Separability Principle (SP): 
“every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is 
separable by the imagination.” (T 1.4.5.5; SBN 233) 
“Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought 
or imagination.” (T App. 12; SBN 634) 
The other principle forms the third premise of the argument. This is Hume's 
Conceivability Principle (e.g. Millican 2009, 649) or Conceivability Criterion of 
Possibility (Garrett 1997, 24) (CCP): 
“Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, may 
exist after the same manner.” (T 1.4.5.5; SBN 233) 
Hume takes these three premises to entail that 
“they [perceptions] are also distinct and separable, and may be consider’d as separately existent, and 
may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence.” (T 1.4.5.5; SBN 
233) 
“All these [perceptions] [...] may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their 
existence.” (T 1.4.6.3; SBN 252) 
“They [perceptions] [...] may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.” (T App. 12; 
SBN 634) 
Compare this with the original passage: 
“Every quality [...] may exist apart” (T 1.4.3.7; SBN 222). 
Thus, the entire argument in Hume's words from T 1.4.5.5 (SBN 233) goes as 
follows: 
(1) “all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe” 
(2) “every thing, which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is 
separable by the imagination.” 
 a) SP 
(3) “Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; and whatever is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, 
may exist after the same manner.” 
 a) CCP 
(4) “they [perceptions] [...] may exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their 
existence.” 
4 Reconstruction of the Argument 
The first premise of the argument concerns the distinctness and difference of  
perceptions. This might appear as a rather easy principle to understand, but it involves 
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complications; here we are at the heart of Hume's system in the Treatise. So the premise 
requires careful reformulation and commenting. 
I think the most cogent reformulation of the first premise is that the perception of 
every simple property is really distinct from the perception of every other entity. This 
raises three immediate questions. (1) Why does it make a statement of simple properties 
only? (2) Why is it formulated in terms of perceptions rather than properties? (3) Why are 
the perceptions of simple properties really distinct from the perception of every other 
entity? After all, Hume does not qualify distinctness and difference in any way in the 
passages under discussion. 
The answer to the first question is simply that the perceptions of simple properties 
are simple perceptions of properties in Hume's view. The reason for this is that simple 
perceptions are nothing but simple properties in the Treatise (when simple perceptions of 
passions, emotions, etc. are excluded). As Hume says at 1.1.7.6 (SBN 20), “to form the 
idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing”. Here “object” must 
include properties because Hume speaks about “qualities” in the context. So the implicit 
transition from qualities in the initial quote (1.4.3.7; SBN 222) to perceptions in the later 
passages is justified. The perception of a simple property, the simple perception of this 
property and this property are the same (recall that I presuppose that for Hume 
perceptions are objects). This is also the reply to the second question, why the first 
premise is formulated in terms of perceptions rather than properties, in addition to the 
structure of the argument. As will be seen below, first Hume draws a conclusion 
concerning perceptions and then he attains a more general metaphysical result on the basis 
of this conclusion. 
There is an implicit interpretation of Hume's simple perceptions that the first 
premise involves. This interpretation may be called compositional as according to it, 
simple perceptions do not have any proper parts – whether parts are spatial or not.8 This is 
due to two points. (1) It represents the view that there are properties that are parts (not 
necessarily spatial) rather than modifications, modes or accidents. (2) In themselves 
                                                 
8  This is relatively neutral on how Hume's complex perceptions should be understood. Even Donald 
L.M. Baxter, who has denied that complex perceptions are single entities in Hume's view, subscribes to it. 
According to Baxter, complex perceptions are merely many things occurring together without forming any 
individuals. (Baxter 2008, 25-8) By contrast, Garrett thinks that they are individuals consisting of simple 
perceptions as their ultimate proper parts (Garrett 1997, 61-4 and 68-75). 
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(separately considered), simple perceptions are qualitatively simple (present only one 
property); as it was noted regarding the first question, they are simple properties9. There is 
also ample textual evidence for the compositional interpretation of simple perceptions – 
first and foremost, Hume's official definition of the distinction between simple and 
complex perceptions: 
Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admitting of no distinction or separation. 
The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.” (T 1.1.1.2; SBN 2)10 
The paradigm example of a Humean simple perception of a property is the simple 
visual impression of an unextended colour point, say, red. Although it might present other 
properties to the mind as a part of a complex perception such as a certain location, in itself 
and separatedly considered it is nothing over and above a particular instance of redness. 
(T 1.2.3.13-16; SBN 38-9) According to Hume's theory, our visual field consists of this 
kind of simple impressions, which are coloured mathematical points (T 1.2.3.4; SBN 
34).11 
That simple perceptions do not have proper parts has important implications, 
regarding the third question (why real distinction): that x is a proper part of y means that x 
is a part of y but y is not a part of x where parthood is a primitive binary relation (proper 
parthood is thus irreflexive). For that reason, they cannot share proper parts with any other 
entity. They do have an improper part though because a thing is its own improper part 
(improper parthood and parthood are reflexive). From this, it follows, however, that two 
                                                 
9  This cannot be challenged by the fact that in the footnote at T 1.1.7.7 (SBN 20-1), which Hume 
inserted into the Appendix to T 3, he says that simple ideas may have different points or circumstances of 
resemblance. Later in the footnote, he is explicit that the “very nature” of simple ideas “excludes all 
composition” (T 1.n.5App; SBN 637). Garrett has also pointed out that simple ideas may have aspects 
because it is possible that they bear different resemblances to distinct ideas (1997, 63). But the point is that 
then they are not conceived in themselves, separately from everything else. 
10  See also 1.2.1.2-5; SBN 26-8, 1.2.2.9; SBN 32, 1.2.3.12-5; SBN 38-9, 1.2.4.1; SBN 39, 1.2.5.12; 
SBN 57-8, 1.4.4.8; SBN 228, and 1.4.5.9; SBN 235. In addition, Hume says that visual and tactile simple 
perceptions are coloured mathematical points (T 1.2.4.3; SBN 40 and 21; SBN 46-7) and his definition of a 
mathematical point is “neither length, breadth nor depth.” (T 1.2.4.9; SBN 42) Therefore he must think – in 
order to be consistent – that visual and tactile simple perceptions are spatially actually indivisible. T 1.4.5.9 
(SBN 235) confirms that he actually thinks so: “Whatever marks the place of its existence either must be 
extended, or must be a mathematical point, without parts or composition.” 
11  It would be an interesting question of Lewis scholarship whether he was influenced by Hume on 
space in his thesis of Humean Supervenience. 
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entities cannot have the same improper part. Thus, simple perceptions cannot share even 
improper parts with any distinct entity. In addition, according to Hume, simple 
perceptions cannot be in the same place at the same time, which might make them not 
only spatially but also compositionally overlapping.12 Hence, they cannot share any parts 
with any other entity including perceptions: they are mereologically disjoint. Recall that 
for Hume real distinction between x and y involves that they do not share parts. Thus, 
simple perceptions are really distinct from every other perception and entity. 
Clearly, this is an atomistic account of perceptions because simple perceptions are 
indivisible into proper parts. In order to see Hume's theoretical reasons for this view, let 
me first say something about Hume on space, or interchangeably for him, extension. In T 
1.2.313, Hume grounds his account of the perception of extension in his equally atomistic 
account of simple visual and tactile impressions and his radically sensibilist or empiricist 
theory of the understanding. First Hume puts forward his Copy Principle: 
“every idea is deriv’d from some impression, which is exactly similar to it” (T 1.2.3.2; SBN 33). 
Then he makes a statement of visual simple and complex impressions and ideas: 
“my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain manner. If the 
eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to 
shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a 
copy of these colour’d points, and of the manner of their appearance.” (T 1.2.3.4; SBN 34) 
According to Hume, the same holds of tactile simple and complex impressions: 
“the impressions of touch are found to be similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts” (T 
1.2.3.5; SBN 34) 
Hence he may conclude concerning all complex impressions of extension and the 
simple visual and tactile impressions that compose them: 
“That compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, that 
are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be call’d impressions of atoms or corpuscles endow’d 
with colour and solidity.” (T 1.2.3.15; SBN 38) 
And of every complex idea of extension and its ultimate proper parts, which are 
simple visual and tactile ideas: 
                                                 
12  Hume rules the possibility out that spatial simple perceptions (visual and tactile) can be in the 
same place at the same time (T 1.2.4.4-7; SBN 40-2 and 1.4.4.9-12; SBN 228-30). For this very reason, 
mere simultaneity cannot make simple perceptions compositionally overlapping, since co-existing simple 
perceptions must be in different places or not in space at all. 
13  See also T 1.2.1.3-4; SBN 27. 
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“The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible” (T 
1.2.4.2; SBN 39) 
The simple-perception part of this argument may be generalised to concern every 
simple sensible perception in the following manner. According to Hume, the atomistic 
account is correct about the simple sense-impressions of the three other senses than sight 
and touch as well. This is evident from his remark that “those perceptions, which are 
simple, and exist no where” because sounds, smells and tastes are non-spatial for him (T 
1.4.5.11; SBN 236). Thus, by the CP, it also holds of the ideas of these simple sense-
impressions of the three other sense modalities. As Hume says: 
“NOW since all ideas are deriv’d from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of 
them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledg’d concerning the other. Impressions and ideas 
differ only in their strength and vivacity.” (T 1.1.7.5; SBN 19) 
The simple ideas of hearing, smell and taste are therefore also compositionally 
simple and really distinct. 
According to Garrett, Hume grounds the general result concerning simple 
perceptions in the Resemblance Thesis of the CP. It entails that the difference between an 
impression and its corresponding idea cannot introduce any metaphysical difference 
because their intrinsic difference is not that of properties. Thus, if a simple impression is 
actually indivisible and really distinct, the corresponding simple idea will be, too. (Garrett 
1997, 66 and 68) In other words, the CP explicates a radical sensibilist or empiricist 
theory of the faculty of the understanding. Recall that according to the CP, every simple 
cognitive object derives from simple impressions (sense-impressions, bodily feelings, 
passions). 
Hence, behind the first premise of this argument of Hume, there are his atomistic 
theory of sense-perception and radical sensibilist or empiricist account of the faculty of 
the understanding. 
The second premise of the argument is Hume's Separability Principle (SP), or to be 
precise, its form that is restricted to perceptions, which I, as was seen before, presuppose 
to be beings in Hume's view. In its general form, the SP concerns potentially every entity, 
actual or possible. This is a justified move although in this context Hume speaks about 
“thought and imagination”, that is, about ideas. The reason for this is that as was seen just 
a moment ago, impressions and ideas cannot differ metaphysically. Then they cannot 
differ in terms of distinctness and separability either. If the idea of x is really distinct and 
separable, then so is the impression of x. 
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However, this again raises the question, why the SP should be stated in terms of 
real distinction and not mere distinction. The simple answer sufficient here is that not all 
entities that are distinct from each other in some way or other are separable in Hume's 
view.  He explicitly says that rational distinction does not imply separability: “What then 
is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor separation?” 
(T 1.1.7.17; SBN 24-5) Real and rational distinction are two forms of distinction that 
Hume explicitly recognises.14 
From the first two premises, the third premise or first sub-conclusion follows: the 
perception of every simple property may be separated from the perception of every other 
entity, that is, may be conceived of without it. If (1) the perception of every simple 
property is really distinct from the perception of every other entity and (2) real distinction 
entails separability in terms of perceptions, then (3) the perception of every simple 
property is separable from the perception of every other entity. 
There is a presupposition, a hidden premise in this line of reasoning that should be 
made explicit before going to the next step. That presupposition rules out the following 
possibility. Even if the perceptions of simple properties did not share parts with any other 
perception, they would still be inseparable from some other perceptions, since they 
causally necessitate these other perceptions. This possibility is thus that the perceptions of 
simple properties cause other perceptions when causation is taken as a stronger necessary 
connection than Hume's constant conjunction (e.g. absolutely necessary connection): 
somehow the effects of the perceptions of simple properties could be read off from them. 
Recall that I am limiting myself to simple proper sensible properties and the perception of 
a simple proper sensible property is the simple proper sensible property. Therefore the 
presupposition is that simple proper sensible properties are causally inert. They do not 
involve any power that would make them inseparable from their effects. The clearest 
statement of Hume's endorsement of this principle can be found in the An Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (1748) where he claims about sensible qualities in 
general, not restricting himself to simple proper sensible qualities, as follows: 
                                                 
14  I have argued elsewhere ([self-reference omitted]) that Hume's system in the Treatise is 
compatible with a third kind of distinction as well: partial distinction (x and y share parts but are not 
identical). 
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“In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or 
energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other 
object, which we could denominate its effect.” (EHU 7.8; SBN 63; see also T 1.3.6.10; SBN 91) 
However, I do not think that this presupposition must be made as a premise of the 
reconstruction of the argument, since it is so self-evidently Humean. In addition, it is 
natural, although not necessary, to think that proper sensible properties (colours, tactile, 
etc.), as they are perceived by the senses, are causally inert in the robust metaphysical 
sense described above. Of course, this leaves it still open that simple proper sensible 
properties involve passive powers: there is some factor in them that makes them capable 
of receiving effects and as such they are strongly necessitated by and inseparable from 
their causes. But Hume does not ever discuss passive powers. So metaphysically robust 
passive powers at least, including those possibly involved in simple proper sensible 
properties, must be excluded for him right from the start. The hidden premise may be thus 
formulated as follows: the perceptions of simple proper sensible properties do not involve 
any powers that would make them inseparable from their causes or effects. 
The next step of the argument is a principle that allows Hume to draw a general 
metaphysical conclusion from the separate perceivability, i.e. the conceivability of simple 
properties.15 The fourth premise is his Conceivability Principle (CCP): conceivability 
entails possibility. The CCP and the third premise entail that it is possible for any simple 
property that is represented by its impression – if there is such a compositionally simple 
property beyond perceptions – to exist independent of any other entity.16 However, as 
Hume scholars know very well, giving an exact account of the CCP is not easy. I will 
only point out three problems: (1) What is the modality in terms of which the CCP is 
stated, and: (2) Does Hume qualify conceivability in one way or another in the principle? 
(3) Can Hume as an empiricist really hold such a rationalist-sounding principle? 
The first question is easier to answer. The modality in question is what Hume calls 
“absolute” or “metaphysical” (T 1.3.14.35; SBN 172). Absolute or metaphysical necessity 
                                                 
15  At the same time, it establishes Hume's view against Berkeley, for example, that simple 
perceptions do not need anything to support them, such as a substantial soul. 
16  This is independent of the question whether Hume is a Metaphysical Realist or not – whether he 
believes in the existence of perception-independent entities or not. Neither does it mean a commitment to 
some form of representational realism. It only says that if there is such a property beyond perceptions and if 
the impression represents it, then the property is also ontologically independent. It might presuppose 
something about the nature of representation though, but that question is out of the scope of this paper. 
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is bound by the law of contradiction: when proposition p is absolutely necessary, not-p 
implies a contradiction. So when not-p does not entail a contradiction, p is absolutely or 
metaphysically contingent as well as not-p. (T 1.3.6.1; SBN 86-7, 1.3.6.5; SBN 89, 
1.3.7.3; SBN 95, 1.3.9.10; SBN 111-12 and EHU 12.27-8; SBN 163-4). In contrast with 
many metaphysicians nowadays, Hume thus runs absolute and logical, and hence 
metaphysical modalities together (T 1.3.3.2-3; SBN 79). 
Hume distinguishes absolute necessity from causal necessity that is not bound by 
the law of contradiction (not-p not implying a contradiction) but by constant conjunctions 
between things (T 1.3.14.35; SBN 172 and EHU 12.28; SBN 163-4; cf. T 1.3.14.23; SBN 
166). Causally necessary propositions are thus contingent in terms of absolute 
metaphysical modality. 
There has been debate in Hume scholarship about the exact nature of conceivability 
in the CCP. Peter Kail, for instance, has defended the account that Hume restricts it to 
adequate conception; Peter Millican has recently attacked Kail's view vigorously (2009, 
Ch. 6). Hume himself fuels this discussion because his formulations of the CCP vary from 
clear and distinct, merely clear or separate conception to bare conception.17 
However, for the present purposes this question is not very relevant. For the 
perceptions of simple properties conceived of separately from the perceptions of other 
entities (premise 3) must satisfy the strictest criteria of conception: having a clear and 
distinct impression or idea; clear and distinct conception is – amongst other things – 
conceiving separately that which is really distinct. So suffice it to formulate the principle 
and the fourth premise in the following manner: conceivability entails absolute or 
metaphysical possibility. In the Humean terms, this means that if we have an impression 
or an idea of x, then it is absolutely or metaphysically possible that x exists. 
The third problem challenges Hume's endorsement of this principle. How can he 
think that he knows that everything that is conceivable is really metaphysically possible? 
He is an empiricist after all, so he does not have pure intellectual concepts or ideas in 
order to get access to metaphysical possibilities. How can he rule the possibility out that 
something that we can imagine is not really metaphysically possible in the end? 
These questions are too difficult and vast problems to discuss in this paper; they 
require their own proper treatment. I can only point out that Hume's subscription to the 
                                                 
17  T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19-20, 1.2.4.11; SBN 43, 1.2.2.8; SBN 32, 1.4.5.5; SBN 233, App. 12; SBN 634, 
1.2.2.8; SBN 32 and 1.3.3.3; SBN 79-80 
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CCP in the Treatise, which I am mainly discussing here, is pretty sure. He claims it 
repeatedly (e.g. T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19-20, T 1.2.2.8; SBN 32, T 1.2.4.11; SBN 43; and 
Abs.11; SBN 650) and employs it in many of his central arguments, such as the one under 
discussion, the system of “mathematical points” is metaphysically possible (T 1.2.2.9; 
SBN 32) and causation cannot be an absolutely necessary connection (e.g. T 1.3.3.3; SBN 
79). Endorsing the principle is sufficient for my argument in this paper. 
Now we are in the position to finish the reconstruction of Hume's argument. Its first 
sub-conclusion/premise 3 was that the perception of every simple property is separable 
from the perception of every other entity. From this, it follows by the CCP that the 
following is absolutely/metaphysically possible. Not only the perception of any simple 
property, which is already a property, but also the possible non-perceptual simple property 
represented by this perception (ultimately impression) would exist even if there were no 
other entity in the world. Ontological independence means exactly this: there could be x 
even if there were no other/distinct entity. Hence, Hume may conclude, perhaps, that 
every (qualitatively and compositionally) simple property is ontologically independent. 
So the argument reconstructed in its entirety goes as follows: 
(1) The perception of every simple property is really distinct from the perception of 
every other entity 
 since it does not have proper parts (compositional interpretation of Hume's 
simple perceptions) 
(2) Restricted SP: real distinction iff separability in terms of perceptions 
(3) The perception of every simple property may be separated from the perception of 
every other entity, i.e. may be conceived of without it (from 1 and 2) 
 presupposition: the perceptions of simple proper sensible properties do not 
involve any powers that would make them inseparable from their causes or 
effects 
(4) CCP: conceivability entails absolute or metaphysical possibility 
(5) Thus: it is absolutely or metaphysically possible that not only the perception of 
any simple property but also the non-perceptual simple property represented by 
the perception (ultimately impression) exists even if there is no other entity (from 
3 and 4) 
(6) Ontological independence of x: it is absolutely/metaphysically possible that x 
exists even if there is no other/distinct entity in the world 
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(7) Thus: every simple property is ontologically independent (from 5 and 6) 
5 Epilogue: Possible Soft Spots of Hume's Argument 
In the introduction, I put forward some reasons as to why this argument is still 
contemporarily relevant. I finish the paper by drawing attention to some points where a 
dependence-trope theorist or a dispositional power ontologist might deny Hume's 
conclusion – what the soft spot of Hume's defense is, perhaps. What I am saying is 
anachronistic and as such not fair to Hume, but my point here is rather Hume's argument 
within the context of contemporary philosophy than the history of philosophy. 
Unfortunately, the following must remain more on the level of hints or guidelines for 
future research than true philosophical argumentation due to the space limit and the nature 
of the paper. 
It seems to me that nowadays premise (1) and the Conceivability Principle are the 
two most controversial steps in Hume's argument. The first premise is founded on an 
atomistic theory of perception and Hume's radically sensibilist/empiricist account of the 
understanding. I am not suggesting that the atomistic theory of perception is dead in the 
21st century, but I doubt whether any philosopher or cognitive psychologist would endorse 
Hume's particular version of it anymore. Hume's radically sensibilist/empiricist account of 
the understanding, the Copy Principle, is also doubtful as it is not at all clear that all 
mental content is copied from (resemble and is caused by) perception (including bodily 
feelings, passions, emotions, and sentiments). 
We can see that the CCP was already controversial in early modern philosophy 
when we understand that for Hume conceivability is having a sense-impression or its 
copy: an idea of the memory or the imagination. Humean conceivability is thus sensible 
conceivability: imaginability in this sense. It is obvious that intellectualist or rationalist 
philosophers like Leibniz did not accept this sensibilist principle. In post-Kripkean 
philosophy nowadays, the situation has not changed in this respect – only the reasons 
might be different. This is evident from the fact that there has been a lively discussion on 
conceivability and possibility in contemporary philosophy as documented by Szabo 
Gendler and Hawthorne (2002) and Vaidya (2007, Ch. 5). Today it might also be thought, 
and with good reasons perhaps, that Hume's view on modality is too simplistic – that he 
does not have a fully developed theory of modality. Hume should have drawn more 
distinctions between different kinds of modalities; logical and metaphysical modalities, 
-20- 
which Hume runs together, are not co-extensive, for instance (see Lowe 1998, 13-6). In 
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